SMRStock Deep DiveNeutral

SMR fell 15.67%: cash was 1.9 billion, with zero orders

UBS downgraded its worst single day of the year, with NuScale holding $1.9 billion in cash but still not holding a single binding commercial contract.

September 14, 2026
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NextPick signal · SMR
Strong sellissued 9/11
Down since signal-1.2%
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NEXT PICK · Market Insights

SMR fell 15.67%: cash was 1.9 billion, with zero orders

Monday, September 14, 2026

UBS downgraded its worst single day of the year, with NuScale holding $1.9 billion in cash but still not holding a single binding commercial contract.

What pushed NuScale Power onto the trending list today wasn't the financial report, the orders, or the approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but a single investment bank changing one word—UBS downgraded its rating from neutral to sell, cutting the target price from $10 to $6.

The market's reaction was unequivocal

The stock closed down 15.67% in a single day, closing at $8.61, with a daytime low of $8.57, and trading volume expanding to 2.9 times the three-month daily average.

The stock's 52-week high was $57.42. From its peak, it has evaporated about 85%, and now less than a $2 buffer remains from the $7.21 52-week low.

Even more awkward, its revenue last quarter was $75,000—not $75,000, not $7.5 million, but $75,000. So here's the question: Why is a company with nearly zero revenue still worth $3.7 billion?

Latest price
$8.61
▼ -15.67%
Height 52 weeks apart
-85%
▼ $57.42 → $8.61
Q2 revenue
$75,000
▼ Year-on-year -99%
$SMRNuScale Power Corporation $8.61▼ -15.67%

The only company that received the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pass had no business

NuScale was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in Corvallis, Oregon, and is developing small modular reactors. Its core product is called the NuScale Power Module, a single 77-megawatt light water reactor that can be connected in parallel like building blocks, with four units combined to form a 308-megawatt capacity.

Its real value isn't the generator, but a single approval document. NPM is the only small modular reactor design to have completed complete design certification by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a process that took over a decade and consumed hundreds of millions of dollars in engineering investment.

Around this license, the company has built the business into a full chain: regulatory and licensing support, power plant design and development, construction, operation and maintenance, nuclear fuel management, staff training, as well as full-process management of ITAAC inspection, testing, analysis, and acceptance required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, along with a set of certified training programs.

Additionally, it is collaborating with Ebara Elliott Energy to develop industrial-grade compressors, aiming to push nuclear heat beyond power generation into industrial scenarios. The list of partners is also quite respectable: Fluor, ENTRA1, Tennessee Valley Authority.

But this full-chain list encountered an awkward fact

FY2025 full-year revenue was only $31.5 million, down 15% from FY2024's $37 million; By Q2 2026, only $75,000 remained.

It's more like a construction company that has obtained the world's only nuclear power construction permit, but hasn't landed its first job yet. So, how much is a construction permit without a construction site really worth?

Traditional valuation tools all fail here, leaving only one subtraction to count

Open NuScale's valuation snapshot and you'll find all the commonly used anchors are gone: the P/E ratio is meaningless due to ongoing losses, enterprise value multiples and free cash flow yields also can't produce decent figures, and earnings per share are negative.

The price-to-sales ratio (P/S) is even more of a joke. Based on $10.69 million in revenue over the past twelve months, the price-to-sales ratio exceeds 340 times; If you use FY2025's $31.5 million, that's also more than a hundredfold; If you use the annualized $75,000 in Q2, that number is too large to be printed.

**But one subtraction still holds

The company has a market capitalization of about $3.7 billion, $1.9 billion in cash and investments on hand, and zero debt as of June 30. ** In other words, the market is paying about $1.8 billion for "everything other than cash."

What is this $1.8 billion buying? It's the possibility represented by that Nuclear Regulatory Commission certification, over a decade of engineering experience, and the initial cooperation framework between ENTRA1 and the Tennessee Valley Authority with a maximum of 6 gigawatts. This is not a pricing of profitability, but a pricing of the probability of an event.

On the cash flow side, the market claim of "food shortages within a year" is not supported by the latest figures. Q2 net loss was $50.1 million, with a loss of $0.13 per share; Meanwhile, liquidity increased by about $900 million compared to the end of March, rising to $1.9 billion.

The money comes from the market—a $750 million stock issuance in Q4 last year, and a large sum in Q2 this year through a market price issuance. UBS itself estimates it will burn about $700 million in cash cumulatively from 2026 to 2028.

So what NuScale lacks isn't money, but money that can come in without dilution. So, is a company that can survive by issuing additional shares at any time safe or dangerous for existing shareholders?

There's another detail worth examining

The staggering $689.6 million operating loss in FY2025, with administrative expenses surging to $609.8 million, mainly due to the recognition of $507.4 million in milestone consideration under the ENTRA1 cooperation milestone agreement. This is a one-time large recognition, not the pace of daily operations.

Veterans of the concept stage, the market voted against using two moving averages

By development stage, NuScale is caught between proof-of-concept and government endorsement. It has already crossed the pure concept threshold—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission complete design certification is the industry's toughest hurdle; But it has not entered commercialization—so far, no binding commercial contract has been implemented.

The historical burden is also real. In November 2023, it signed termination agreements with UAMPS and CFPP LLC, declaring the cancellation of its carbon-free power project—the closest the company has come to a real construction site. Now, the biggest hope has shifted to ENTRA1's negotiations with the Tennessee Valley Authority, while management can only say during the Q2 call, "The talks went well, and we can do it once signed."

The initial guidance for this binding power purchase agreement was set for the end of 2025, and now it has already passed the third quarter of 2026. So, can a repeatedly delayed agreement still be considered a catalyst, or has it already become a risk?

The market's attitude is written on two moving averages

The 50-day moving average is $9.14, the 200-day moving average is $12.87, and the stock price has fallen below both at $8.61, with the price nearly 50% above the 200-day moving average. Trend investors have long since left; those who remain are betting on a contract.

Unique certification is becoming an increasingly narrow window

In the small modular reactor track, NuScale is the only player holding the complete design certification for nuclear tubes—this is undisputed. The controversy is: how much longer can this certificate remain exclusive?

GE-Hitachi's BWRX-300 unit has a single unit of about 300 megawatts, based on mature boiling water reactor technology. It has entered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's pre-application review. Although its certification progress lags behind, it is backed by General Electric and Hitachi, giving it clear capital and supply chain advantages. It pursues "one big unit," while NuScale focuses on "four small units," with overlapping target markets.

TerraPower's Natrium is about 345 megawatts, with sodium-cooled fast reactor routes endorsed by Bill Gates and supported by the Department of Energy, with demonstration projects landing in Wyoming; Kairos Power's Hermes reactor is about 35 megawatts, a fluorine salt-cooled high-temperature reactor, which began construction in 2024 and is being validated through rapid iteration.

X-energy's Xe-100 uses high-temperature gas-cooled pebble bed technology, with dual turbines about 80 megawatts, also funded by the Department of Energy's advanced reactor demonstration project, planned for deployment in Washington State; The UK's Rolls-Royce SMR targets about 470 megawatts of pressurized water reactors and has submitted design review to the UK Nuclear Regulatory Office, but there is no clear commercial path in the US market.

UBS's downgrade is striking—competitors are moving toward "groundbreaking," while NuScale's estimated construction cycle exceeds five years and still lacks clear customer commitments; The bank assumes the first project will not begin construction until 2028.

Certification is a door, but keeping the door open doesn't mean someone is coming in. When others are already pouring concrete and you're waiting for the customer to sign, is the first-mover advantage a moat, or is it a time lag that someone else is already running?

The ceiling is painted very high, but the floor hasn't been poured yet

The global nuclear power market is estimated to be in the $500 to $800 billion range annually. As an emerging subset, small modular reactors are expected to have a penetration rate between 5% and 15% from 2030 to 2040, corresponding to an addressable market of about $25 billion to $120 billion per year.

If global decarbonization accelerates after 2040 and the share of nuclear power increases significantly, this ceiling could be pushed above $200 billion per year, but that would require meeting the triple assumptions of policy support, cost reduction, and increased public acceptance.

Falling to NuScale itself: based on a modular portfolio of 77 to 308 megawatts and customer profiles for municipal power, large industrial, and grid operators, the U.S. market size in 2030 is expected to be $5 billion to $15 billion per year, with a theoretical reachable share of $1 billion to $5 billion per year.

The premise is that it secures the contract. Currently, the immediate realizable income is almost zero—$75,000 in Q2, with no binding contracts in hand. If the first order is secured within the next 12 to 18 months, even for a small demonstration project, annualized income could fall between $50 million and $200 million; If not, it will remain stuck at zero.

The biggest risk in this industry has never been insufficient demand, but a slipping timeline. The IEA and U.S. Department of Energy have baseline forecasts that the first commercialization projects will appear around 2030, but delays of 2 to 10 years for nuclear power projects have become the historical norm.

If that 6 GW agreement is put to paper

The bulls are not buying the current financial statements, but a set of unrealized certainties. When these reasons are put together, the logic is self-consistent:

▲ Bull Case
The only small modular reactor design in the U.S. to complete the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's complete design certification, with certification taking over a decade and costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Competitors must retrace the entire process to catch up
ENTRA1's initial framework with the Tennessee Valley Authority covers up to 6 GW and six power plants in seven states. If converted to a binding power purchase agreement, it would be the largest nuclear power deployment program in U.S. history
With $1.9 billion in cash and investments on hand, zero debt, and liquidity increased by about $900 million quarter-on-quarter in Q2, there is no short-term survival crisis
Full-chain service capabilities cover licensing, design, construction, operation and maintenance, fueling, and training, including full process management by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and ITAAC. The cost of integrating multiple suppliers is extremely high for clients
Diverse collaboration network: Fluor's engineering and project management, Romania's RoPower FEED Phase II completed, Ebara Elliott Energy's industrial compressors, and fuel cycle memorandums of understanding with Curio and Framatome
Long-term lock-in electricity is being repriced, demand for enterprise-level long-term power purchase agreements is strong, and brownfield grid connection rights are becoming increasingly scarce, making modular nuclear power a natural fit for this structural need
Currently, nearly all of the $3.7 billion market cap is priced in options, and once the first binding contract appears, even on a small scale, the revaluation space will be asymmetrical

Revenue dropped 99%, while time was on the side of its competitors

Bears don't need to tell stories, they just need to read the numbers. The arrangement of these numbers itself forms the argument:

▼ Bear Case
Revenue structural collapse: $8.2 million in Q3 2025→ $600,000 in Q1 2026 → $75,000 in Q2, a year-on-year decline of over 99%, and not seasonal fluctuations
Q2 revenue of $75,000 versus a net loss of $50.1 million, making the ratio of revenue-to-cost meaningless to discuss
Valuation anchors have completely failed: P/E ratio is not applicable. Based on $10.69 million in revenue over the past twelve months, the price-to-sales ratio exceeds 340 times, which is purely speculative pricing
To date, there are no binding commercial contracts. The company clearly disclosed in its annual report risk factors that "cannot guarantee the signing of binding contracts with customers." The CFPP project was terminated in 2023
The binding agreement guidance for the Tennessee Valley Authority has slipped from the end of 2025 to the third quarter of 2026 and still hasn't materialized; the extension itself is a signal
UBS judges that competitors are moving toward construction, while NuScale's construction cycle exceeds five years, and the first project may start in 2028, causing the first-mover advantage to be diluted by time
Cash is substantial but comes from continuous issuances: $750 million in financing in Q4 last year, replenished capital by issuing at market price in Q2 this year, with existing shareholders continuously diluted

Three timelines determine whether it is a revaluation or a continued bearish decline

There aren't many events that will truly change the pricing logic of this stock, but each one carries significant weight:

ENTRA1 signed a binding power purchase agreement with the Tennessee Valley Authority: the impact is expected to be extremely positive from 2026 to 2027, and it will be the only event that can disprove the short position
Romania's RoPower project progressed from FEED phase II to final investment decision: timeline to be determined, and positively, it is the first overseas site that could be implemented
Q3 2026 Financial Report: Expected to observe marginal recovery in November 2026; if the zero price continues, expectations will be further revised downward
The U.S. Department of Energy has increased funding to support or sign long-cycle material procurement agreements: 2026 to 2027, which is neutral to positive and can help ease dilution pressure
More power companies verify the scarcity of brownfield grid connection rights, driving demand for long-term power purchase agreements: around Q4 2026, the impact is weak but the direction is favorable
Chain reaction from analyst ratings: UBS has switched to selling, most institutions covering the stock remain holding, target price range spanning from $6 to $25, and further downward revisions would amplify short-term volatility

From 14 billion to 3.7 billion, a curve smashed by two disappointing expectations

NuScale went public through a SPAC in 2021, with its market value once reaching about $14 billion—the most generous moment for the small modular reactor sector. In 2022, NPM received NSC design certification, becoming the first approved SMR design in the U.S., reigniting excitement.

The first disillusionment occurred on November 7, 2023—with the signing of termination agreements with UAMPS and CFPP LLC, the carbon-free power project was canceled, and the only visible construction site disappeared.

The second disillusionment was slower and more thorough. FY2024 revenue was $37 million, FY2025 dropped to $31.5 million, with a net loss of $355.8 million; Entering 2026, Q1 revenue was $600,000, Q2 was $75,000, and business effectively came to a halt.

The stock price has slid from a 52-week high of $57.42 to today's $8.61, down about 28% this year, about 70% over the past twelve months, with a cumulative drawdown of about 85%. The market initially overestimated not technology, but the speed at which technology turns into orders.

The next validation node is in the third-quarter report in November. If revenue remains at zero and the Tennessee Valley Authority's agreement still hasn't been finalized, then today's 15.67% will not be the end of this round of decline.

⚠️ Risk Notice

Non-binding commercial contracts, with core business models still unverified by any real orders
Revenue fell over 99% year-on-year, business effectively came to a halt, and the timing of recovery was completely unpredictable
Continuing to survive through stock issuances, existing shareholders face repeated dilution, and the pace of financing is beyond their control
Competitors are accelerating: Kairos has started construction, TerraPower has endorsement from the Ministry of Energy, and GE-Hitachi has scale and capital advantages
Delaying nuclear power projects by 2 to 10 years is the industry norm, and the probability of a commercial timeline slipping is not low
Beta 2.31, with volatility far exceeding the broader market, and external events like rating downgrades can cause double-digit drops

🟡 Neutral

Cash is enough to hold out, but orders are delayed, betting on time rather than fundamentals.

💬 Discussion

Bottom line: Do not hold heavy positions before signing contracts. Real-time buy and sell positions, post SMRs on the official account for viewing.

Data source

Source: NextPick real-time snapshot + company quarterly and annual reports and earnings call + SEC filing + mainstream financial media and sell-side research summaries.

Disclaimer: This article is for reference only and does not constitute investment advice. Markets carry risk — invest with caution.